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THE LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT
ACT: WHY THE PROPOSED U.S.
COMPULSORY LICENSING SCHEME WILL
FAIL TO EXPORT ANY MEDICINES OR
SAVE ANY LIVES

INTRODUCTION

I

n the twenty-six years that have passed since doctors observed the
first cases of AIDS, no region of the world has escaped the wrath of
the AIDS pandemic.1 Fortunately, the HIV incidence rate2 reached its
highest levels in the late 1990s, and has since stabilized.3 Nevertheless,
an estimated 38.6 million people around the world were afflicted with
HIV in 2005, including approximately 4.1 million new HIV infections
and 2.8 million AIDS deaths.4 Although there is no cure for HIV/AIDS,
antiretroviral drug treatment slows the progression of the virus. As a result, antiretroviral drug treatment has decreased the number of
HIV/AIDS-related illnesses and deaths globally.5 However, access to
1. See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2006 Report on
the Global AIDS Epidemic, 1 (May 30, 2006), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV
_data/2006GlobalReport/default.asp. At the Special Session of the United Nations
(“UN”) General Assembly on AIDS in 2001, 189 nations acknowledged the high priority
of the AIDS epidemic by signing the historic Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.
The Declaration established steps to encourage the UN’s Millennium Development Goal
to stop and begin to reverse the AIDS epidemic by 2015. See generally G.A. Res. 55/2,
para. 19, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). To monitor progress, the Declaration
required assessment of the epidemic at the end of 2003, 2005, and 2010. See id. The 2006
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic provides “the most comprehensive set of data on
the country response to the AIDS epidemic ever complied.” UNAIDS, 2006 Report on
the Global AIDS Epidemic: Executive Summary, 3 (May 30, 2006), available at
http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf. One
hundred and twenty-six countries, with active participation by civil society groups, submitted information for the report. See id.
2. The “HIV incidence rate” is the number of people newly infected with HIV in a
given year compared to the number of previously uninfected people. See UNAIDS, 2006
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, supra note 1, at 8.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 150. At the International AIDS Conference XI in 1996, studies were
presented to show that antiretroviral treatment was effective in preventing AIDS-related
illness and death. In the years following the conference, the number of AIDS-related
deaths dropped significantly in high-income developed countries, while the number of
deaths in low- and middle-income countries continued to skyrocket. See id.
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antiretroviral drugs is limited in sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS
plagues citizens more than in any other area of the world.6 In recent
years, there has been international activism demanding a universal human right to access life-saving treatment.7 As a result, access to antiretroviral drugs has increased in sub-Saharan Africa.8 In 2005, more than
five times as many people used antiretroviral drugs in low- and middleincome countries compared to those who used the drugs in 2001.9 Nevertheless, in sub-Saharan Africa, still only about one in six (seventeen percent) of the 4.7 million people needing antiretroviral drug treatment now
receive it.10
There is no panacea that will resolve the problem of access to essential
medicines in impoverished countries.11 These countries often lack adequate health care systems and sufficient numbers of doctors or other
health care workers to prescribe and distribute the drugs.12 In addition,
government regulations often hinder access to essential medicines,
through taxes on essential medicines or regulatory red tape.13 Notwithstanding these infrastructure problems, poverty—and the resulting inability to afford essential medicines—is arguably the most significant barrier
to access.14 Even though access to essential medicines would face many
6. See id. at 15. In 2005, almost sixty-four percent of all people suffering from HIV
(24.5 million people), and almost nine out of ten children under the age of fifteen suffering from HIV (2.0 million children) live in sub-Saharan Africa. In the same region, there
were approximately 2.7 million new HIV infections, and approximately 2.0 million AIDS
deaths. See id. For country-specific HIV/AIDS data in sub-Saharan Africa, see id. at 15–
23.
7. See id. at 150.
8. See id. at 152–53. On World AIDS Day 2003, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) introduced the ambitious “3 by 5 Initiative,” which sought to provide three
million people in developing countries with antiretroviral drugs by 2005. WHO, About
the 3 by 5 Initiative, http://www.who.int/3by5/about/initiative/en (last visited Oct. 9,
2007). Although the 3 by 5 Initiative didn’t meet its goal, it spurred global action to increase access to HIV/AIDS treatment. See UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS
Epidemic, supra note 1, at 150.
9. See id. at 151. Antiretroviral drug use increased from approximately two hundred
and forty thousand people in 2001 to approximately 1.3 million people in 2005. See id.
10. See id. at 15. Furthermore, progress throughout sub-Saharan Africa has not been
uniform. While at least fifty percent of those needing antiretroviral treatment in Botswana
and Namibia in 2005 received it, access in many other countries is as low as ten percent.
See id. at 152. One-quarter of antiretroviral drug use in sub-Saharan Africa can be found
in South Africa. See id. at 15.
11. See WHO Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health [CMH], Macroeconomics and
Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development 86 (Dec. 20, 2001).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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obstacles even in the absence of pharmaceutical patents, patents affect
prices, and remain a significant hurdle to access to medicines.15 Protection of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) permits a patent holder to
charge high prices for patented brand-name medicines and grants a monopoly on the protected drug during the life of the patent.16
In April 2006, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) Commission
on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (“CIPIH”)
published its report to illustrate how an emphasis on protecting IPR may
affect issues of public health.17 The Commission concluded that “innovation [is] pointless in the absence of favourable conditions for poor people
in developing countries to access existing, as well as new products. . . .
Intellectual property rights are important, but as a means not an end.”18
On one side of the debate, high prices of patented drugs are justified because they are necessary to fund a pharmaceutical company’s research
15. See generally DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 53 (2004)
(“IPRs are exclusive rights granted to the creators of knowledge-based commodities to
market their creations. This grant is deemed necessary in order for the creators to engage
in creative activity and production.”).
16. See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent Rights:
“Compulsory Licensure” and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29, 34 (2002). IPR
advocates argue that a right to one’s ideas can be based on traditional property laws. Because knowledge and innovation are forms of “property,” there are libertarian justifications for patent law, which argue that a person should have a right to both the tangible
and intangible products of one’s labor. See id.
Philosopher John Locke argues that, based on natural law principles, non-human
resources are gifts from God, to which all of humankind enjoys a common property right.
See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 27–31. According to Locke, a person creates a private
property right to these resources by using labor to increase the value of the property, as
long as the person leaves enough of the resource for others. See id. (citing JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1698)). It is argued that
Locke’s concern with common property rights does not mean that knowledge and ideas
are also gifts from God to be shared by humankind. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 315 (1988). Instead, because ideas are inexhaustible, and one person’s use of an idea does not deplete the common property, people
are free to take and protect their ideas as private property under Locke’s labor theory of
property. See id.
17. See WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/. In May, the
World Health Assembly and World Trade Organization (“WTO”) member states agreed
to set up CIPIH to assess the relationship between the fields of intellectual property
rights, innovation, and public health. The Commission was given the task of collecting
data from different sources and recommending appropriate funding and incentives for the
creation of new pharmaceutical products to fight diseases affecting developing countries.
See id.
18. Id. at ix–x.
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and development (“R&D”). Each successful medical innovation that results in millions of dollars in profits must pay for the millions of dollars
lost during the countless failed R&D efforts.19 Nevertheless, these patents, and the high costs of the patented drugs they protect, are not justified to the extent that they deprive those who cannot afford life-saving
medication.20
This Note does not attempt to resolve all of the barriers preventing access to essential medicines.21 Instead, this Note focuses solely on the responsibility of the United States, as a developed country with immense

19. See PhRMA, Key Industry Facts/About PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/key_
industry_facts_about_phrma/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), discussing the findings of the Tufts Center for
the Study of Drug Development, reports that development of a new drug is estimated to
cost a pharmaceutical company $802 million, and takes an average of ten to fifteen years
to get the drug from the laboratory to the pharmacy shelf. A pharmaceutical company
recovers its R&D costs mainly from commercially successful products. PhRMA reports
that out of 5,000 to 10,000 screened compounds, only 250 compounds succeed to reach
preclinical testing, five pass preclinical testing to reach human clinical trials, and only
one compound is eventually approved by the Food and Drug Administration. See id.
Consequently, proponents of pharmaceutical patents argue that the patents are
necessary to allow temporary market exclusivity. Market exclusivity would permit these
pharmaceutical companies to recoup their economic costs, profit from their inventions,
and would incentivize future innovations.
20. Among these reasons are those founded in international law and principles of
moral obligation. First, the right to health is emphasized in customary international law.
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 325, 336 (2003) (citing International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3). Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) acknowledges “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” Id. In addition, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee recognized that a state’s minimum obligation pursuant to the ICESCR is to provide access to essential medicines. See id. at 337. Moreover, the right to enjoy the scientific progress in medicine derives from Article 15 of the ICESCR, which “recognize[s]
the right of everyone . . . [t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”
applies to medications. Id. at 344.
Second, the obligation to developing countries is also supported by moral obligation. Under the theory of utilitarianism, there is a fundamental moral obligation to act
when others are in need. Moreover, the greater the benefit to the person in need and the
less hardship it causes for the actor, the more important is the obligation to act. See Michael A. Santoro, Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying
Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 923,
936–37 (2006).
21. Moreover, this Note does not argue that patents should not be granted for essential
medicines, and recognizes that patent protection may be necessary to promote innovation
and technological advances.
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resources in the pharmaceutical sector,22 to help impoverished countries
that do not have the manufacturing resources to supply their citizens with
essential life-saving medicines.23 In light of this duty, the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act24 was introduced in 2006 to establish a compulsory licensing system that permits U.S. pharmaceutical companies to
manufacture generic equivalents of patented medicines for export to developing countries.25 This Note focuses primarily on whether the LifeSaving Medicines Export Act establishes an optimal compulsory licensing system by providing the most effective incentives to generic drug
companies to manufacture life-saving medicines for export to developing
countries.
First, Part I discusses the development of IPR at the international level
and its impact on pharmaceutical policies in the United States. Next, Part
II investigates the key provisions of the Life-Saving Medicines Export
Act. Then, Part III identifies the key provisions of the Pledge to Africa
Act, which established a Canadian compulsory licensing system. Part IV
addresses the flaws with the Pledge to Africa Act, and analyzes the improvements that the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act has made over its
Canadian counterpart. Furthermore, it examines whether the improvements made in the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act are sufficient to
incentivize generic companies to participate in the compulsory licensing
system, thereby insuring that the legislation will succeed in increasing
access to essential medicines for those who need them the most. This
Note argues that while the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act eases procedural barriers and increases economic incentives for generic pharmaceutical companies, these changes alone are not enough. No matter how
altruistic a generic company may be, or how severe a pandemic—like
AIDS—may become, failure to incorporate greater financial incentives
will render the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act useless in the fight to
improve the life or death problem of access to essential medicines.

22. See generally PHRMA, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007 19 (2006). In 2005, PhRMA
member companies invested approximately $39.4 billion in new R&D. Id. at 19.
23. In addition to altruistic reasons for assisting poorer countries, the United States
should be motivated by its own self-interests. For example, such legislation would help
improve U.S. relations in the international community. In addition, by addressing public
health crises in other countries, the United States also decreases the chances of those
health crises spreading to the United States. Furthermore, the United States ensures that
these developing countries will be able to sustain their roles within the global economy.
See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
When the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was created in 1995 as
the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”),26 “ideas and knowledge” were becoming more significant in
international trade.27 At the same time, varying levels of protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights were causing greater strain in
international economic relations.28 As a result, the WTO member states
agreed upon and codified minimum standards that each state government
had to meet in order to protect domestic IPR, as well as the IPR of other
WTO member states.29 With respect to patents, WTO member states
agreed that patents must be available to inventors, and patent holders
should enjoy a minimum set of exclusive rights to the invention for an
initial period of time.30 However, concern later arose over ensuring that
the WTO standards did not prevent WTO member states from addressing
issues of public health.31 As a result, the WTO adopted a new approach
to assisting people in developing countries who suffer from lifethreatening diseases.32 The WTO now permits countries such as the
United States, who possess robust pharmaceutical sectors, to produce and
sell generic drugs to nations in need of the life-saving medication.33

26. See WTO, The Multilateral Trading System—Past, Present and Future,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm (last visited Oct.
9, 2007).
27. WTO, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). Intellectual
property, consisting of ideas and knowledge, is best explained through examples:
Most of the value of new medicines and other high technology products lies in
the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved.
Films, music recordings, books, computer software and on-line services are
bought and sold because of the information and creativity they contain, not
usually because of the plastic, metal or paper used to make them.
Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
See infra Part I.A.
See id.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See id.
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A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
On January 1, 1995, the WTO implemented the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).34
The objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to protect and enforce intellectual property rights in order to reward and promote technological inventions.35 At the same time, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the need to
transfer and disseminate this new knowledge to benefit social and economic welfare.36 The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that concern
patents require that WTO member states provide a patent for any technological invention that is new, non-obvious, and useful.37 In exchange for
these rights, a patent applicant must disclose information about the invention that would allow a “person skilled in the art” to create the product.38 If the application is granted, the patent holder has the ability to
prevent others from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” the invention.39 These exclusive rights are protected for twenty
years from the date that the applicant files the patent application.40
However, there are some exceptions to the exclusive rights that have
been granted to the patent holder. Specifically, Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement permits WTO member states to use the invention without the
patent holder’s authorization.41 Included in such allowed use is government use and government-authorized third-party use pursuant to a “compulsory license.”42 Before the government authorizes use of the inven34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. The WTO was created on January 1, 1995 as the successor to GATT.
WTO, What is the World Trade Organization?, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The TRIPS Agreement is one of
several WTO agreements that serve as the WTO’s rules on trade. WTO, Overview: A
Navigational Guide, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 7.
36. See id.
37. See id. art. 27(1). Extending far beyond pharmaceuticals, patents are available for
“products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Id.
38. Id. art. 29(1).
39. Id. art. 28(1).
40. See id. art. 33.
41. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31.
42. See id. The TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory licensing.”
Instead, Article 31 discusses “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder.”
Compulsory licensing is only one example of such “other use.” See WTO, Obligations
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tion, it must ensure that the patent holder’s rights are respected. First, the
compulsory license applicant must first make “efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions” and have been unsuccessful “within a reasonable period of time”
prior to filing the compulsory license application.43 Nevertheless, the
government may waive this required effort in cases of “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” or for “public noncommercial use.”44 Second, Article 31 requires that “adequate remuneration” be paid to the patent holder for use of the invention.45 Article 31(h)
explains that the payment will take into account “the circumstances of
each case” and “the economic value of the authorization.”46
Article 31 also allows only limited use of the invention by the compulsory license applicant. Because the patent holder is still entitled to use of
the invention, the compulsory licensee’s rights are non-exclusive.47 In
addition, the compulsory license applicant may not use the invention beyond the scope for which the compulsory license was granted.48 Furthermore, Article 31 limits the government’s authority to grant compulsory licenses to inventions used predominantly in the domestic market.49
B. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
The TRIPS Agreement raised concerns that poor countries may face
greater difficulties in obtaining drugs because of the TRIPS Agreement’s
safeguards on intellectual property.50 In response, WTO member states
adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
(“Doha Declaration”) on November 14, 2001 at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar.51 First, the Doha Declaration “recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”52 Second, aland Exceptions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31(b).
44. Id.
45. Id. art. 31(h).
46. Id.
47. See id. art. 31(d).
48. See id. art. 31(c).
49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, art. 31(f).
50. See WTO, The Separate Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/
English/tratop_e/trips_e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
51. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
52. Id.
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though the Doha Declaration acknowledged that the protection of IPR
promotes the development of new medicines, it also recognized that the
patent system causes increased drug prices.53 Third, the Doha Declaration affirmed that the TRIPS Agreement “should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health . . . and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines
for all.”54
The Doha Declaration therefore provides flexibility to the TRIPS
Agreement to ensure that intellectual property protection does not create
obstacles to the management of public health problems.55 For example,
the Doha Declaration recognizes the right of WTO member states to
grant compulsory licenses to generic drug companies to permit manufacturing of patented brand name drugs.56 In addition, the Doha Declaration
allows each WTO member state to determine the grounds for granting
compulsory licenses.57 WTO member states also have the right to define
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,”58 under which the TRIPS Agreement permits a WTO member state to waive
the requirement that the generic drug manufacturer must have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with the patented drug manufacturer before
the proposed user may obtain a compulsory license. Specifically, the
Doha Declaration explains that “public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”59 The Doha Declaration, however, leaves unresolved the problem of WTO member states that lack manufacturing capabilities in the
pharmaceutical sector to effectively use compulsory licensing, in what is
referred to as “Paragraph 6.”60 The Declaration recognizes the problem,
and instructs the TRIPS Council to report back to the General Council
with a solution to the problem by the end of 2002.61 In the interim, be53. See Doha Declaration, supra note 51, para. 3.
54. Id. para. 4.
55. See id. para. 5.
56. See id. para. 5(b).
57. See id.
58. Id. para. 5(c).
59. Doha Declaration, supra note 51, para. 5(c).
60. See id. para. 6.
61. See id. para. 6 (“We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.”).
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cause Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement limits products made under
compulsory licenses to domestic use, the Doha Declaration left countries
without the resources to produce pharmaceuticals without access to lifesaving medications.62
C. The Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003
On August 30, 2003, the General Council approved a draft decision
(“2003 Decision”) which amended the TRIPS Agreement by implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.63 The 2003 Decision makes it
easier for poor countries, unable to manufacture medicines themselves,
to import generic drugs made in other countries under compulsory license.64 The 2003 Decision lifted the ban on exporting generic drugs
made under compulsory licensing by permitting export of such generic
drugs to “eligible importing Members.”65 An eligible importing country
is one which is a “least-developed country” (“LDC”),66 or a WTO mem62. Press Release, WTO, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug
Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/
pr350_e.htm.
63. See WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Decision].
64. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 509 (“[n]oting . . . the instruction . . . in
paragraph 6 of the [Doha Declaration] to find an expeditious solution to the problem of
the difficulties that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector could face in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement”).
65. 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510.
66. The UN Committee for Development Policy reviews the list of least-developed
countries every three years. In the 2003 Report of the UN Committee for Development
Policy, qualification for the category of “least-developed country” (“LDC”) is based on
three criteria:
(1) low-income, measured by the country’s average of the gross national income (GNI) per capita;
(2) human resource weakness, measured by the country’s human assets index,
which factors in the country’s nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy;
and
(3) economic vulnerability, measured by the country’s economic vulnerability
index, which factors in the country’s structural vulnerability rather than vulnerability resulting from government policy.
To be added to the list, a country must meet all three criteria. To become eligible to
graduate from the list, a country must meet minimum threshold levels for two of the three
criteria. To qualify for graduation, a country must meet two of the three criteria for two
consecutive reviews. See UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed
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ber state that has notified the TRIPS Council that it is importing “in the
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency
or public non-commercial use.”67 A WTO member state seeking to import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory license must notify
the TRIPS Council of the specific names and quantities of requested
medicines.68 In addition, the eligible importing country must confirm that
it is a “least-developed country” or has “insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” for the requested medicines.69
The 2003 Decision also includes provisions that ensure that the medicines are used to protect public health, and not for industrial or commercial policy objectives.70 For instance, compulsory licenses must limit the
medicine production to only the amount necessary to meet the needs of
the importing country.71 In addition, the generic drugs produced under
compulsory license must be physically differentiated from their patented
equivalents, using means such as special packaging or special colors or
shapes of the drugs.72 The 2003 Decision also charges the importing
country with taking “reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion
to prevent re-exportation of the products.”73 Furthermore, all countries
are required to have legal safeguards to prevent importation of these
drugs in violation of this compulsory system.74
On December 6, 2005, WTO member states approved the 2003 Decision’s changes to permanently amend the TRIPS Agreement.75 Although
the amendment will not take effect until two-thirds of WTO member
states have ratified the changes by the December 1, 2007 deadline, these
changes remain in effect until then.76

Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, The
Criteria for the Identification of the LDCs, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/
ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007); UN Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm. for Dev. Policy, Report on the Sixth Session (2 March – 2 April 2004), 15–
18, UN Doc. E/2004/33 (2004).
67. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See WTO, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 62.
71. See 2003 Decision, supra note 63, at 510.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 511.
74. See id.
75. See Press Release, WTO, Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility
Permanent, WTO Doc. Press/426 (Dec. 6, 2005).
76. See id.
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D. Changing U.S. Viewpoints on Intellectual Property Rights and Public
Health
The United States arguably has the strictest patent system of WTO
member states.77 This adherence to intellectual property protection is reflected in the U.S. response to South Africa’s Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act, which was introduced in 1997.78
The Act took several steps to promote access to cheaper drugs in order to
combat the AIDS epidemic in South Africa.79 The Act was enacted in an
attempt to reduce drug prices by: (1) prohibiting price markups, (2) encouraging generic drugs, and (3) allowing South Africa’s health minister
to ignore its patent laws when a health crisis exists.80 In response, thirtynine pharmaceutical companies, with the support of the U.S. government, sued the South African government for enacting legislation that
violated the TRIPS Agreement.81 Moreover, the U.S. government threatened trade sanctions against South Africa if it implemented the Act.82
However, the dispute ended when the pharmaceutical companies
dropped their lawsuit because of the public protest over the lawsuit.83
In 2001, this strict U.S. policy on patent protection reached a turning
point. Just as the nation changed dramatically in the aftermath of the
September 11th attacks, so too did the U.S. government’s views on patent protection.84 In October 2001, there were numerous cases of deaths
resulting from anthrax exposure, which created fear of a bioterrorism
attack.85 Despite a shortage of Cipro—the only anthrax antibiotic the
77. See also Erika Mullenbach, Comment, The Influence of Disease on the Evolution
of U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth to
Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 227, 229–32 (2005) (explaining that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, and the United States in general, criticize
the TRIPS Agreement for providing flexibility to “strict, U.S.-style” patent protection).
78. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Medicine Merchants: Patent and Patients; As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000,
§ 1, at 18.
79. See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A1.
80. See id.; McNeil, supra note 78.
81. See Swarns, supra note 79.
82. See McNeil, supra note 78. The U.S. Department of Commerce placed South
Africa on a watch list, which is the first step leading to trade sanctions. In addition, Congress passed a bill that required South Africa to drop the Act in order to receive any U.S.
aid. Moreover, President Clinton also voiced his disagreement to President Nelson Mandela. See id.
83. See Swarns, supra note 79.
84. See generally Mullenbach, supra note 77, at 239.
85. See Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Disease; U.S. is Stepping Up Plan
for Handling Anthrax Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at A1.
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had approved—
pharmaceutical company Bayer A.G.86 refused to permit other companies
to manufacture Cipro.87 The U.S. government wanted to purchase a
stockpile of Cipro to treat Americans in the event of a widespread attack,
but was unable to convince Bayer to significantly lower their prices.88 In
response, the U.S. government threatened to bypass the Cipro patent and
follow Canada’s lead in resorting to generic alternatives to combat the
anthrax attacks.89 However, the United States did not need to override the
Cipro patent; Bayer agreed to further reduce the price of Cipro, and a
deal between Bayer and the U.S. government was reached.90 The U.S.
response to the anthrax scare, in light of its reaction to South Africa’s
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, was
strongly criticized as “blatant hypocrisy.”91 The United States was
viewed as having a double standard—one standard “regarding the accessibility of patent relaxation in the context of health emergencies which
confront ‘us,’” and a different standard “in the context of health emergencies which constantly confront ‘them’ in the developing world.”92
Although five people died as a result of the anthrax attacks in 2001,93 the
severity of the national emergency was far from comparable to the
HIV/AIDS crisis in countries such as South Africa.94 Therefore, in light
of this evident double standard that Western countries may hold, WTO
member states—both developed and developing countries—easily agreed
that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted to improve public
health.95
The U.S. Trade Representative welcomed the 2003 Decision, which
“allow[s] countries to override patent rights when necessary to export
life-saving drugs to developing countries that face public health crises

86. See id.
87. See Keith Bradsher, A Nation Challenged: The Antibiotic; Bayer Insists Cipro
Supply is Sufficient; Fights Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at B7. Bayer’s Cipro
patent was not scheduled to expire in the United States until 2003. See id.
88. See Keith Bradsher with Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: Cipro; U.S.
Says Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7.
89. See id. The Canadian Health Ministry overrode Bayer’s Cipro patent and ordered
a Canadian pharmaceutical company to produce a generic equivalent to Cipro. See id.
90. See id.
91. Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth
Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 447 (2003).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 447 n.110.
94. See id. at 447.
95. See id.
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but cannot produce drugs for themselves.”96 Moreover, international organizations such as the WHO CIPIH urge: “Countries should provide in
their legislation powers to use compulsory licensing, in accordance with
the TRIPS agreement, where this power might be useful as one of the
means available to promote, inter alia, research that is directly relevant to
the specific health problems of developing countries.”97 To that same
end, the Life-Savings Medicines Act of 2006 was introduced as “the
catalyst for saving the lives or improving the health of millions of families in impoverished nations.”98
II. LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT ACT OF 2006
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Life-Saving Medicines Export
Act to Congress on May 25, 2006.99 The purpose of the Life-Saving
Medicines Act is to promote public health by establishing the infrastructure to permit U.S. generic drug companies to manufacture life-saving
medicines in the United States under compulsory license, and then export
these medicines to developing countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capability in the pharmaceutical sector to produce the life-saving
medicines themselves.100
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act seeks to amend Title 35 of the
United States Code, which governs patents.101 Specifically, it establishes
procedures for granting authority to the Under Secretary for Commerce
for Intellectual Property and Director of the Patent and Trademark Office
to issue compulsory licenses.102 Moreover, the Life-Saving Medicines
Export Act also establishes an office within the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) to assist countries seeking medicines to identify pharmaceutical companies that may manufacture such medicines under compulsory license.103 The Act also explicitly states that the generic company’s
action under the compulsory licensing system is not an infringement of
the patent.104

96. Life-Saving Medicines Export Act of 2006, S. 3175, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(1)
(2006).
97. WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 17, at 176.
98. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5245 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
99. See id.
100. See generally S. 3175 § 2.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. § 3(a).
104. See id. § 4.
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The pharmaceutical company seeking to produce the essential medicine (“generic company”) must submit an application to the PTO, identifying the eligible importing country in need of the medicine (“importing
country”).105 An importing country must be: an LDC,106 a WTO member
state that has certified to the WTO General Council of its intent to participate in the compulsory licensing system, or a non-WTO member state
that lacks the manufacturing capacity to produce the drug itself.107 Moreover, the generic company may apply for a multi-country license for the
production of medicine that will be exported to multiple countries.108 Although only eligible countries may import medicines through the proposed compulsory licensing system, the application may also include the
names of any nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) that will assist the
importing country with the medicines.109
The generic company may apply for a license for any pharmaceutical
product,110 but must specify the scope of the drug production. The generic company must first specify the name of the drug it seeks to produce
and export, as well as the patented equivalent,111 where the patented drug
has received either WHO or U.S. FDA approval.112 In addition, the generic company must estimate the quantity of medicines to be produced
and exported.113 Before an application is approved by the PTO, the generic company must show that it made efforts to negotiate directly with
the patent holder.114 Specifically, the generic company’s application must
include a copy of a written request to the patent holder asking for a voluntary license to produce the drug, as well as a description of any subsequent negotiations.115 The generic company is also required to wait at
least sixty days after sending the request before submitting an application
to the PTO for a compulsory license.116
105. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining least-developed country).
107. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act defines a “pharmaceutical product”
eligible for generic production as “any patented product, or pharmaceutical product, including components of that product, manufactured through a patented process, of the
pharmaceutical sector including any drug, active ingredient of a drug, diagnostic, or vaccine needed to prevent or treat potentially life threatening public health problems.” Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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Once the application has been submitted, the PTO must approve or
deny the application within sixty days.117 A denied applicant must appeal
the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, subject
to final review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari.118 If the application
is approved, the generic company is limited to producing the medicine
for only the importing country listed in the application, and must export
the medicine only to the importing country.119 The compulsory license is
effective for seven years, but the generic company may apply for a license renewal once, which would extend the license for an additional
seven years.120 Moreover, if the generic company notifies the PTO that
the original estimated quantity of the drug will not be sufficient to meet
the importing country’s need, the PTO may increase the licensed drug
quantity without need for a new license application.121 A compulsory
license may cease to exist, however, if the PTO determines, pursuant to a
petition by the patent holder, that the circumstances warranting the compulsory license no longer exist and will not reoccur.122
The generic company is also responsible for distinctly labeling and
packaging the medicine so that it is distinguishable from the patented
drug, and is identifiable as created under the compulsory licensing system.123 However, this requirement may be waived if it is not feasible, or
if doing so would significantly impact the price of producing the drug.124
Moreover, the requirement may be waived “under urgent circumstances
for limited quantities.”125
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also requires a generic company granted a compulsory license to pay remuneration to the patent
holder within forty-five days after the generic company exported the
drugs to the importing country.126 In order to set a reasonable royalty
117. See S. 3175 § 3(a). The PTO has the option of denying an application but requesting additional information. The generic company must submit the supplemental information within thirty days of the PTO’s request. The PTO then makes a final decision within
sixty days of receipt of the additional information. See id.
118. See id. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may set aside the PTO decision if it
finds the decision to be: (1) “arbitrary [or] capricious,” (2) “contrary to constitutional
right,” (3) “in violation of a statutory right,” or (4) “without observance of procedure
required by law.” Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
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amount, the PTO consults with Health and Human Services, the National
Institutes of Health, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and
the Centers of Disease Control.127 The remuneration is capped at four
percent of the commercial value of the drug, but in determining the royalty amount, the PTO considers: “[T]he need for the [generic company] .
. . to make a reasonable return sufficient to sustain a continued participation in humanitarian objectives,” “[t]he humanitarian and noncommercial
reasons for issuing a compulsory license,” “[t]he economic value to the
importing country,” “[t]he need for low-cost pharmaceutical products by
persons in eligible countries, in the importing country,” “[t]he ordinary
levels of profitability in the United States . . . and any relevant international trends in relevant prices as reported by the United Nations or other
appropriate humanitarian organizations.”128 In addition, if the importing
country is on the UN Human Development Index (“HDI”), or suffers
from circumstances similar to a country on the index, the required royalty payment is much lower than the four percent cap.129
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also provides safeguards to ensure that medicine production is not impeded by onerous procedures during times of emergency.130 Therefore, if the importing country is in a
state of “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” the PTO may employ expedited approval procedures.131 Moreover, the PTO may waive any requirement of the compulsory licensing
system—including the requirement that the generic company first negotiate with the patent holder—or may postpone the royalty calculation
until after the application has been approved.132
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also directs the PTO to establish the National Advisory Board on Implementation of the General
Council Decision to provide guidance with the compulsory licensing system, including determining appropriate royalty amounts.133 Recognizing
the importance of expert advice, the Board will include scholars and ex-

127. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
128. See id.
129. See id. If the country is on the HDI, the rate for royalty calculation is as follows:
1 + (total number of HDI countries) – (importing country’s HDI rank)
(total number of HDI countries)
See id.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See S. 3175 § 5.

X 0.04
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perts in fields affecting, as well as those impacted by, the compulsory
licensing system.134
III. CANADA’S BILL C-9: AN ACT TO AMEND THE PATENT ACT AND THE
FOOD AND DRUGS ACT (“THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA
ACT”)135
On May 14, 2004, Canada amended its Patent Act to authorize compulsory licenses for the production of generic drugs for export to eligible
developing countries.136 By enacting this legislation, Canada became the
first Group of Eight137 country to implement the WTO General Council’s

134. See S. 3175 § 5(c). The Board shall include the following ten members: one “academic expert on the subject of pharmaceutical matters and patent law;” two “individual[s]
with expertise relating to the WTO, the TRIPS/health solution, and the General Council
Decision;” two “individual[s] with expertise relating to the needs of persons living in
least-developed and developing nations with respect to access to low-cost patented pharmaceutical products;” two “individual[s] who represent international organizations, such
as the United Nations, the World Bank, international nongovernmental organizations, and
religious faiths, and who have expert knowledge regarding the General Council Decision
and the issues raised by that decision;” one “physician with experience in treating persons
with HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, or other infectious diseases;” one “individual
representing major pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States;” and one “individual representing major generic manufacturers of pharmaceutical products in the
United States.” Id.
135. The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, together with supporting regulations,
comprises what is now referred to as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”).
See Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/intro/context_
e.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
136. See The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 23 (Can.).
137. The Group of Eight (G8) is “an unofficial forum of the heads of the leading industrialized democracies.” The Group holds summits regularly as a forum “to harmonize
attitudes to acute international problems” by reaching informal agreements on individual
measures each country can take to achieve the Group’s goals. Although it is not a formal
international organization, the G8 has working groups, expert groups, and task forces. See
Official Web site of the G8 Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006,
http://en.g8russia.ru/g8/history/shortinfo/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The G8 was founded
in 1975, when leaders of France, Japan, the United States, Britain, and Italy met to discuss current economic problems existing at that time. Canada joined the Group the following year, and Russia became a member in 1998. Because the G8 includes all of the
world’s major economic and political powers, their decisions on key global issues have
great impact. For example, the G8 countries donated $1.4 billion to set up the Global
Health Fund, which is used for different projects that fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria around the world. See What is the G8 Summit?, http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1078995913300
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
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Decision of August 2003.138 The stated purpose of the legislation is “to
facilitat[e] access to pharmaceutical products to address public health
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics.”139 The Pledge to Africa Act received the support of NGOs,
civil society groups, and even the pharmaceutical industry.140 Nevertheless, widespread criticism within these same groups resulted in a general
consensus that the bill’s flaws may prevent it from achieving its goal of
improving access to life-saving medicines.141 Harsher critics accuse the
Canadian government of betraying people in developing countries by
passing legislation that “perpetuate[s] inequitable access to medicines by
inviting anti-competitive behaviour by multinational pharmaceutical
companies, protecting these companies’ monopolies and [profiting] at
the expense of the lives of patients.”142 During its drafting, however, the
Canadian government implemented suggestions by brand name pharmaceutical companies, generic companies, and civil society organizations to
address potential weaknesses with the legislation.143 Nevertheless, more
138. See Rachel Kiddell-Monroe, Canada’s Generic Drug Law is All Talk, No Action,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 14, 2006, at A15; Mark D. Penner & Prakash Narayanan, Amendments to the Canadian Patent Act to Address Drug Access: Is Help on the
Way?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459, 460–61 (2005).
139. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.01.
140. See generally Press Release, United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF],
UNICEF Hails Canada’s Move to Expand Access to AIDS Drugs (Sept. 29, 2003) (praising Canada’s Pledge to Africa Act as “the first major move by a major, industrialised
country to overcome a key structural hurdle in getting life-saving medicines to people
who desperately need them”).
141. See e.g., CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO
AFRICA ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/
downloadFile.php?ref=696 (identifying the main flaws as: (1) the Act limited pharmaceutical products available for compulsory license, (2) the Act had additional requirements
for non-WTO members compared to WTO members, (3) and a compulsory license
granted under the Act had a short lifespan).
142. Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières [MSF], Amending Canada’s Drug Patent
Law: A Betrayal of Patients in Developing Countries (Feb. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadDocumentFile.php?ref=459.
143. See News Release, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Canada Proceeds with
Bill C-9 on Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Initiative is Important, and Urge Other
Countries to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadDocumentFile.php?ref=453. A
number of civil society groups contributed their expertise to the Canadian Parliament by
proposing amendments to the Pledge to Africa Act to improve the legislation’s efficacy.
See id. Additionally, amendments to the Pledge to Africa Act included recommendations
by members of the Canadian generic pharmaceutical industry. See News Release, Cana-
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than three years after the Pledge to Africa Act was introduced into Canadian law, no developing country has received life-saving medicines
through the new Canadian compulsory licensing system.144
Under the Pledge to Africa Act, the Canadian government may issue a
compulsory license for a defined set of patented medicines for export to a
defined set of developing countries.145 The medicines available for generic production are limited to the pharmaceutical products that were on
the WHO list of essential medicines146 and were patented in Canada at
the time that the Pledge to Africa Act was enacted.147 The Pledge To Africa Act also limits export of the generic medicines to countries that are:
LDCs,148 WTO member states that have not declined to use the system as
importers, or WTO member states that have stated an intent to participate
in the compulsory licensing system only if they face national emergency
or insufficient manufacturing capacity for the medicine they seek under
the license.149 However, the Pledge to Africa Act includes procedures for
updating the lists of medicines and eligible countries.150 The Minister and
the Minister of Health may recommend the addition of any patented
product that addresses a health problem in a developing country.151

dian Generic Pharmaceutical Ass’n [CGPA], Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall
Short (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news%5Capr_20_
04.shtml.
144. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
145. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04, Schedule 1–4.
146. See WHO, Essential Medicines, http://www.who.int/medicines/services/ess
medicines_def/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). The WHO Expert Committee on
the Selection and Use of Essential Medicine compiles the essential medicines list by selecting products that satisfy priority health care needs, and takes into consideration the
disease prevalence, as well as the comparative efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness of
medicines. See id.
147. See Lalita Acharya & Kristen Douglas, Canada Library of Parliament, Bill C-9:
An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act: Legislative Summary 2
(Mar. 3, 2004); Pledge to Africa Act, supra note 136, at Schedule 1.
148. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (defining least-developed country).
149. See Acharya & Douglas, supra note 147, at 2. The Pledge to Africa Act includes
three schedules of eligible importing countries. Schedule two lists all countries that the
UN has determined are LDCs. Schedule three lists all WTO member states that have not
declined to use the compulsory licensing system to import medicines. Schedule four lists
all WTO member states who have stated an intention to use the compulsory licensing
system only in the event of a national emergency or other extreme urgency situation. See
id.
150. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03.
151. See id. § 21.03(1)(a). Based on a recommendation by the Minister and Minster of
Health, the Governor in Council may add “any patented product that may be used to address public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
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Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International
Trade, and the Minister for International Cooperation may recommend
additional eligible importing countries.152 Furthermore, a non-WTO
member state may be added if it is on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (“OECD”) 153 list of countries that are eligible for official development assistance, the country faces “a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” and has “insufficient[] pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture that product.”154
Like the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, the generic company must
submit an application specifying the name and quantity of the drug it
seeks to produce and export and its patented brand-name equivalent.155 In
addition, the generic company must have made a written request to the
patent holder for a voluntary license, and must wait at least thirty days
after such unsuccessful negotiation before filing an application for the
compulsory license.156
The Pledge to Africa Act also requires that the generic company pay
remuneration to the patent holder.157 The Governor in Council determines an appropriate royalty amount in light of the humanitarian and
non-commercial reasons behind the compulsory license.158 However, the
patent owner may seek a Federal Court order that requires a royalty
payment greater than the amount that the Governor in Council has determined.159 The Federal Court may only order a higher royalty payment
if the Court finds that the Governor in Council’s remuneration determination is inadequate, when considering the humanitarian and noncommercial reasons behind the compulsory license and the medicine’s
economic value to the importing country.160
When a compulsory license is granted in Canada, it is valid for two
years, with the opportunity to renew the license for an additional two
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”
See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(a)(i).
152. See id. §§ 21.03(1)(b)–(d).
153. The thirty member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development are “committed to democracy and the market economy.” OECD, About
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
154. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(d)(ii).
155. See id. § 21.04(2). Compare id. with S. 3175 § 3(a) (discussing the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act compulsory license application).
156. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04(3)(c).
157. See id. § 21.08.
158. See id. §§ 21.08(1)–(2).
159. See id. §§ 21.08(4)–(6).
160. See id. § 21.08(7).
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years.161 The generic company must produce medicine that is physically
distinguishable from the patented equivalent through distinct “marking,
embossing, labelling, and packaging.”162 In addition, the Minister of
Health must approve the generic drug as meeting the requirements of
Canada’s Food and Drugs Act.163
The patent owner may apply to the Federal Court for an order terminating the compulsory license.164 The patent holder must show that either
the application for the compulsory license contained inaccurate information, or that the generic company did not follow provisions of the license,
such as paying the specified remuneration to the patent holder or exporting only to the authorized importing country.165 The patent owner may
assert that: (1) the compulsory license application contained inaccurate
information; (2) the generic company failed to set up a Web site required
to disclose information about the generic medicines;166 (3) the generic
company failed to notify the patentee, importing country, or the medicine
purchaser within fifteen days of exporting the medicines;167 (4) the generic company has failed to pay the required royalty within the prescribed time; (5) the generic company failed to provide the Commissioner or the patent holder with a copy of the agreement underlying the
compulsory license application;168 (6) the medicines were re-exported
with the generic company’s knowledge; (7) the medicines were exported
to somewhere other than the authorized importing country; (7) the quantity of exported medicines exceeded the authorized amount; or (8) the
medicines exported to a non-WTO member state have been used for
commercial purposes.169

161. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §§ 21.09, 21.12(1)–(4).
162. Id. § 21.04(3)(b). See generally Anthony P. Valach, Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the
Rights of Patent Holders and Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries,
4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 168–70 (2005) (explaining that the generic company
must consider that changes to pill size, shape and color may incidentally affect the generic medicine’s bio-equivalence to the patented medicine).
163. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.04(3)(b).
164. See id. § 21.14.
165. See id.
166. See id. § 21.06 (requiring the generic company to establish a Web site to disclose
information on the product, the importing country, and the distinguishing features of the
generic medicine, as well as the date when the medicine is exported).
167. See id. § 21.07 (requiring the generic company to notify the parties involved that
the generic medicines will be exported within fifteen days).
168. See id. § 21.16 (requiring the generic company to provide a copy of the underlying agreement and a statement defining both the monetary value of the agreement and the
number of units to be sold pursuant to the agreement).
169. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.14.
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The Federal Court may also terminate the license if it finds that the underlying agreement to sell the generic medicines is “commercial in nature.”170 If the Court terminates the license because of a commercial
agreement, the Federal Court may order the generic company to turn
over any remaining medicines to the patent holder, as though the generic
company had infringed on the patent.171
The Pledge to Africa Act provides for an advisory committee to facilitate the administration of Canada’s compulsory licensing system.172
However, unlike the advisory board created pursuant to the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act,173 the Canadian advisory committee’s duties are
extremely limited. The advisory committee only advises the Minister and
the Minster of Health in the recommendations that the Minister and the
Minister of Health make to the Governor in Council regarding additions
and deletions to the list of approved patented products.174
IV. A MORE EFFICIENT COMPULSORY LICENSING INFRASTRUCTURE IN
LIGHT OF THE CRITICISMS OF THE PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT
When the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act was introduced, U.S.
lawmakers were confident that it addressed the flaws found in other
countries’ similar legislation.175 Specifically, lawmakers identified key
provisions of Canada’s compulsory licensing legislation that made generic companies reluctant to participate.176 The most striking criticism,
however, is that more than three years after the legislation was passed, a

170. 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.17. The agreement may be deemed “commercial in nature”
if the generic medicine is sold for more than twenty-five percent of the price of either the
patented medicine or any equivalent medicine that has been produced with the patent
holder’s consent. However, this determination also takes into account the generic company’s need to make a reasonable return on the medicines, the normal profitability of
commercial pharmaceutical agreements, and international pricing trends for products
supplied for humanitarian purposes. See id. § 21.17(1)–(2). In finding a commercial
agreement, the Federal Court may fashion a remedy on “any terms that it considers appropriate.” Id. § 21.17(3). Rather than terminating the license, the Court may instead
require the generic company to pay the patent owner a royalty amount that adequately
compensates for the commercial use of the medicine. See id. § 21.17(3)(b).
171. See id. § 21.17(4)(a). In the alternative, the patent holder may nevertheless permit
the generic company to release the remaining medicines to the importing country. See id.
§ 21.17(4)(b).
172. See id. § 21.18.
173. See S. 3175 § 5. See also supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
174. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.18.
175. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5246–47 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
176. See id.
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single pill has not left Canada.177 The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act
was touted as addressing the concerns over a Canadian law that “permits
dilatory and needless litigation, omits important medicines from a complex list of covered drugs, and creates unnecessary bureaucratic
hoops.”178 Nevertheless, even if the United States does succeed in addressing these so-called flaws, lawmakers must look at whether this is
enough to allow the U.S. law to succeed. Unfortunately, no country has
established a benchmark TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing system
that has effectively increased access to essential life-saving medicines.179
However, by addressing the concerns raised over the Pledge to Africa

177. See Lisa Priest, Canadian Companies Agree to Share Generic AIDS drugs with
Rwanda, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 9, 2007, at A3. However, the first pills may
leave Canada in the near future. On July 19, 2007, Rwanda became the first country to
inform the WTO of its intent to use the 2003 Decision to access life-saving medicines.
See WTO: 2007 News Items, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/public_
health_july07_e.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). Rwanda, a country with 250,000 people
infected with HIV, seeks to import antiretrovirals under Canada’s compulsory licensing
system. See Lisa Priest, supra, at A3. Multinational pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) subsequently gave its consent under the Canadian compulsory licensing system to permit the Canadian company Apotex to produce an antiretroviral that
contains two molecules that have been patented by GSK. See Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK Gives Consent Under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime for Generic Version of HIV/AIDS Medicine for Use in Rwanda (Aug. 8, 2007). Moreover,
GSK has agreed to waive royalties provided that Apotex supplies the drugs to Rwanda on
a no-profit basis. See id. On September 25, 2007, a compulsory license was granted to
Apotex, permitting it to proceed with manufacturing the antiretroviral. See ApoTriavir
Approved by Health Canada Under CAMR Provisions, ANTI-INFECTIVE DRUG NEWS,
Sept. 25, 2007. If the agreement is completed, up to 16 million tablets of the antiretroviral
will be sent to Rwanda, or enough to treat 21,000 Rwandans for one year or 200,000
Rwandans for one month. See Lisa Priest, supra, at A3. Apotex, however, cautioned that
not all barriers to access have been removed. See id. Apotex must still reach similar
agreements regarding the other patented molecules contained in the antiretroviral that are
not patented by GSK. See id. (quoting Apotex’s director of public and government affairs: “The bottom line is that the patentees have not lifted all of the barriers to shipment.
. . . Apotex cannot ship tomorrow.”).
178. See 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
179. It may be helpful to note Brazil’s Industrial Property Law permitting compulsory
licensing. Although the law is not used to produce generic medicines, Brazil has successfully negotiated with multinational pharmaceutical companies by threatening to grant
compulsory licensing to generic companies. As a result of these threats, patent holders
have negotiated affordable antiretroviral drugs. Therefore, although Brazil did not issue a
compulsory license, it attained a price reduction of essential medicines that may not have
been possible without compulsory licensing legislation. See Rahul Rajkumar, The Central
American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the Doha Declaration on Trips
and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 443 (2005).
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Act, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act is off to a good start creating
an effective compulsory licensing system. Most of the arguments over
the Pledge to Africa Act point out that the Canadian compulsory licensing system incorporates stringent regulations that are not necessarily required by the WTO’s 2003 Decision.180 Moreover, critics emphasize that
the Pledge to Africa Act involves burdensome bureaucratic red tape and
procedural barriers, which may prevent essential medicines from getting
to people that need them in developing countries.181 More importantly,
however, a compulsory licensing system will only succeed if it gives generic companies the economic incentive to participate. If the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act does not provide sufficient financial motivation,
generic companies will not produce affordable essential medicines, regardless of how many people might die as a result.182 Unfortunately, despite a praiseworthy attempt, the incentives provided by the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act will not be enough to succeed. If the U.S. government passes the legislation as it currently stands, it will follow in the
footsteps of the Pledge to Africa Act; not a single pill will leave the
United States.
A. Provisions Unnecessary to Comply with the WTO Agreements
One focus of strong criticism of the Pledge to Africa Act is its limitation on medicines that can be produced under compulsory license.183 The
Canadian government only permits compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical products that were on the WHO list of essential medicines and were
protected by Canadian patent when the Pledge to Africa Act was en-

180. See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Canada Proceeds with Bill C-9 on
Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Initiative is Important, and Urge Other Countries
to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model, supra note 143.
181. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (discussing criticism by NGOs,
civil society groups, and the pharmaceutical industry).
182. See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 163.
183. The argument that the Pledge to Africa Act, as well as any other legislation of its
kind, should not be limited to a specific list of medicines is grounded in a broad interpretation of the Doha Declaration. Paragraph 1 “recognize[s] the gravity of the public health
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” Doha Declaration,
supra note 51. As such, the Doha Declaration should extend to all public health needs.
Furthermore, the Doha Declaration affirms “that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.” Id. By making such a general statement, the WTO can be seen as addressing all health issues, and
not just a set of specific diseases. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
317, 328 (2005).
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acted.184 However, this original list omits “even the most widely sought
fixed-dose combination of anti-retrovirals.”185 Although the Minister and
the Minister of Health may review and approve new medicines,186 this
process may find itself stuck in bureaucratic red tape for months. The
Life-Saving Medicines Export Act addresses this issue by permitting the
production of any pharmaceutical product used to combat lifethreatening public health problems.187 Because it does not limit the list of
approved medicines, the Life-Saving Medicines Act addresses current
public health issues, as well as unforeseeable future issues. In addition,
the proposed U.S. system eliminates the procedural barriers involved in
maintaining and updating a list of approved medicines.
Critics of the Pledge to Africa Act also object strongly to the limitations on eligible importing countries. The original list includes UNdetermined LDCs and WTO member states that have either: (1) not declined to import under the compulsory licensing system, or (2) stated an
intention to use the system for national emergency or insufficient manu184. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedule 1. See also supra notes 146–47 and accompanying
text. The Canadian government has amended the original list of permissible pharmaceutical products since the Pledge to Africa Act was passed. See Order Amending Schedule 1
to the Patent Act (Oseltamivir Phosphate) SOR/2006-204 (Can); Order Amending
Schedule 1 to the Patent Act (Lamivudine + Nevirapine + Zidovudine) SOR/2005-276
(Can).
185. See Kiddell-Monroe, supra note 138.
186. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.03(1)(a). See also supra note 151 and accompanying
text. The medicine approval process was put to the test when a generic pharmaceutical
company sought to add oseltamivir phosphate to Canada’s list of approved medicines.
Oseltamivir, better known as the patented drug Tamiflu, is effective against various
strains of influenza, such as the fatal H5N1 strain of avian flu. See Legal Network Calls
for Compulsory Licensing of Tamiflu, NETWORK NEWS, Mar. 2006, at 6. On February 13,
2006, generic pharmaceutical company Biolyse formally requested that oseltamivir phosphate be added to the Patent Act’s Schedule 1 drugs that are eligible for export. See Letter from Joanne Csete, Executive Director, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, to Susan
Bincoletto, Director General, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, Industry Canada
(July 26, 2006), available at www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?
ref=706. On July 1, 2006, the Departments of Industry and Health published a proposed
order that would amend Schedule 1 of Canada’s Patent Act, which lists the approved
medicines. See id. However, the Canadian federal government did not add oseltamivir to
Schedule 1 until over seven months later. See Helen Branswell, Canada Agrees to Add
Tamiflu to List of Drugs That Can Be Made Off Patent, CANADIAN PRESS, Sep 27, 2006.
187. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. It is
interesting to note that the United States called for a “limited approach” during WTO
negotiation talks concerning the TRIPS Agreement, and wanted to limit the diseases that
the Doha Declaration covered. By doing so, the United States sought to limit the number
of patents that would be overridden by compulsory licenses and to diminish the risk that
pharmaceutical revenues would be jeopardized. See Abbott, supra note 183, at 327–29.
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facturing capacity.188 Additionally, a non-WTO member state may be
added to the list of approved countries if it is on the OECD’s list of countries eligible for official development assistance.189 Nevertheless, because Canada’s original list includes only WTO members states, it fails
to recognize that many developing countries’ citizens have no access to
essential medicines, regardless of whether the country is a WTO member
state or not.190 Although the Pledge to Africa Act includes procedures for
adding eligible importing countries, such procedures cannot happen immediately, and a country may have to wait months to be reviewed and
approved. In addition, as countries are added or removed from the UN
list of LDCs or acquire WTO membership, Canada’s list of eligible
countries must be updated, resulting in an additional administrative burden. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, on the other hand, avoids
this unnecessary red tape; there is no specific list of eligible importing
countries.191 Instead, the U.S. compulsory licensing system may export
to: UN-determined LDCs, WTO members that have stated their intention
to use the system, and non-WTO member states that lack adequate manufacturing capabilities to produce the requested drug.192 Therefore, the
United States reduces the administrative costs of maintaining a list, and
more importantly, does not exclude any countries that are in need of lifesaving medicines.

188. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedules 2–4. See also supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. Countries such as East Timor and Lebanon are excluded from the list of eligible importing companies because they are neither LDCs nor WTO members. See Policy
Statement, Development & Peace, Urgent Appeal to Amend Bill for Cheap Medicines to
HIV/AIDS Patients (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.devp.org/testA/policy/
declarations04_2-e.htm.
189. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.03(d)(ii). See also supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
190. MSF, Amending Canada’s Drug Patent Law: A Betrayal of Patients in Developing Countries, supra note 142, quoting Richard Elliott, Director of Legal Research and
Policy at the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network (“People in all developing countries
struggle with poverty and public health needs, and should benefit from this important
legislation regardless of whether their country belongs to the WTO.”).
191. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. Again,
as with the “limited approach” to medicines eligible for generic production under compulsory license, the United States ironically sought to limit the countries “with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” that were provided for
in the Doha Declaration. Abbott, supra note 183, at 334–35. In doing so, the United
States and other developing countries could limit the number of patents that would be
overridden, as well as minimize the amount of revenues that would be lost by patentowning pharmaceutical companies. See id.
192. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
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The Pledge to Africa Act is also widely criticized for requiring generic
companies to enter into export agreements only with state governments.193 Therefore, NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors
without Borders, are not granted access to life-saving medicines under
the Canadian system.194 International agencies and NGOs play a critical
role in treating public health needs in developing countries and often
have more knowledge about a country’s large-scale health epidemic than
government officials.195 Moreover, NGOs may also know the best way to
administer the life-saving medicines to improve public health.196 The
Life-Saving Medicines Export Act acknowledges this problem and permits licensees to include the names of NGOs that will assist the importing country with the medicines.197 However, this provision does not permit export agreements between a generic company and an NGO. If an
NGO seeks essential medicines, it must work with a country’s government to obtain these medicines. Moreover, if an NGO wants to supply
essential medicines for a given disease in multiple countries, it must coordinate with each country’s government. NGOs may face roadblocks if
a government lacks resources, or is simply reluctant, to collaborate in
this effort. Unnecessary procedures such as these decrease the chances
that essential medicines will reach people in need. Although the drafters
of the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act specifically wanted to include
NGOs in the U.S. compulsory licensing system, the existing provision is
not optimal. Instead, generic companies should be permitted to enter into
export agreements directly with NGOs, provided that the NGOs supply
the generic medicines to eligible importing countries.
B. Procedural Barriers
The Pledge to Africa Act also creates “unnecessary bureaucratic
hoops” by potentially requiring generic companies to unnecessarily file

193. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 Schedules 2–4. See also supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. In making amendments to the proposed Pledge to Africa Act, the Canadian
government recognized the need for generic companies to contract directly with NGOs,
and consequently proposed an amendment to address the issue. However, this amendment was removed in the process of last-minute changes. See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal
Network, Canada Proceeds with Bill C-9 on Cheaper Medicine Exports: NGOs Say Initiative is Important, and Urge Other Countries to Avoid the Flaws in the Canadian Model,
supra note 143.
194. See Acharya & Douglas, supra note 147, at 2; Penner & Narayanan, supra note
138, at 467.
195. See Valach, supra note 162, at 172.
196. See id.
197. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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many compulsory license applications.198 First, a Canadian compulsory
license permits a generic company to produce a specific quantity of
medicine for only one country. Therefore, if the importing country needs
an increased quantity of the same medicine, the generic company must
submit an application for a new license, which authorizes the additional
drug quantity.199 A new application for an increased drug quantity, which
could feasibly occur on a regular basis, is an unnecessary waste of time
and resources. Moreover, if multiple countries need the medicine, the
generic company must submit a compulsory license application for each
country. Again, this requirement creates needless paperwork for both the
generic company and the Canadian government.200 Second, the Governor
in Council has only two options in deciding an application—either grant
the application or deny it. Therefore, if the generic company fails to include one piece of necessary information, the application is denied and
the generic company must start the application process from the beginning.
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act addresses each of these deficiencies. First, a generic company need not submit separate applications
if the quantity of medicine they seek to produce changes or multiple
countries need the medicine. If the generic company discovers that the
importing country needs additional medicines, the generic company notifies the PTO, and the PTO may increase the authorized amount of medicines if it is appropriate.201 Second, the Life-Saving Medicines Export
Act provides for multi-country licenses, in which the generic company
submits one application for authorization to export medicines to multiple
specified countries.202 In addition, when the PTO considers a compulsory
license application, it has three options for its decision. In addition to
granting or denying the application, it may also deny the application with
a request for more information, giving the generic company thirty days to
respond without having to start a new application. A new application
would not only require the burden of redundant paperwork, but would
also require the generic company to request a voluntary license from the
patent holder, and then wait an additional sixty days after submitting that
request to submit a compulsory license application to the PTO.

198. 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
199. See Valach, supra note 162, at 168.
200. See id. at 169.
201. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
202. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The Pledge to Africa Act has also been criticized as “permitting dilatory and needless litigation.”203 The Pledge to Africa Act grants the patent holder the right to petition the Federal Court to review the authorized
license for numerous reasons.204 Although many of the grounds for termination ensure that the compulsory licensing system is not abused,
other grounds for termination penalize the generic company for technical
administrative violations. For example, a license may be terminated if the
generic company fails to maintain or update a Web site that is required
by the Act, or fails to notify the proper parties during the exporting process.205 The patent holder may use these administrative grounds to frustrate the generic company or to delay the production of the essential
medicines. Consequently, a generic company may be deterred from participating in the compulsory licensing system because of the threat of
litigation.
In addition, the patent holder has the right to litigate in Federal Court
over whether the export agreement is “commercial in nature.”206 Unlike
the above-mentioned grounds for Federal Court, the Court applies a balancing test to determine whether an export agreement is commercial in
nature.207 Because the result of a balancing test is always uncertain, and
there is no case law that predicts the outcome, generic companies may be
reluctant to take this risk, especially if they are not expecting high
enough levels of profit from the license agreements to cover the cost of
drawn-out litigation.
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act reduces the grounds upon
which the patent holder may challenge a compulsory license. A patent
holder may petition the PTO for review of a compulsory license only if

203. 152 CONG. REC. S233-01, S5247 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
204. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.14; Penner & Narayanan, supra note 140, at 467–69
(“[A] more significant roadblock for the use of the authorization under the Pledge to Africa Act may be the potential uncertainty associated with any such authorization. This
uncertainty arises from the ability of the Federal Court, at the request of the patentee, to
review and possibly amend the terms of the authorization.”). See also supra notes 164–69
and accompanying text.
205. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.14. Jim Keon, President of CGPA, explained that “‘[i]t
is unlikely that a generic company would spend the time and money fighting the brands
in court over these contracts . . . . Once the brand company initiated litigation, the generic
firm would probably withdraw its request for a license.’” CGPA, Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143. See also supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
206. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.17. See also supra notes 170–71 and accompanying
text.
207. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 §21.17(2). See also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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the patent owner believes that “the circumstances that have led to the
granting of the license cease to exist and it appears probable that such
circumstances will not reoccur.”208 Although it seems like this single
provision encompasses all of the enumerated administrative provisions of
the Pledge to Africa Act, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act nevertheless does away with the provision permitting the patent holder to challenge a compulsory license because it is “commercial in nature.” As
such, this omission decreases the risk that a compulsory license will be
revoked after the generic company has spent multiple years and millions
of dollars developing the medicines.209
One must further analyze the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act to determine whether it streamlines compulsory licensing while sustaining
compliance with the TRIPS agreement. One of the most important issues
a country must address is whether the law eliminates injunctive relief to
the patent holder.210 The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act avoids this
potential obstacle by amending the patent laws to expressly state that
production of medicines pursuant to the Life-Saving Medicines Export
Act does not constitute patent infringement.211 Therefore, patent holders
are not entitled to injunctive relief against the generic company.212
In addition, an optimal compulsory licensing system must eliminate
procedural barriers in times of exigency.213 The Life-Saving Medicines
Export Act provides for such expedited approval for “emergencies and
circumstances of extreme urgency,” including waiving the required prior
negotiation with the patent holder, as well as postponing the royalty determination until after the compulsory license has been granted.214
Moreover, a compulsory licensing system is more efficient if it utilizes
administrative review procedures instead of judicial review.215 The Life208. S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 122 and accompanying text.
209. See CGPA, Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143.
210. See JAMES LOVE, Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH 241, 245 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006).
211. See S. 3175 § 4. See also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
212. Current patent laws provide the patent holder with injunctive relief. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”); 35
U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
213. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245.
214. S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
215. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245 (identifying the need that “a remedy to an anticompetitive practice be . . . administrative rather than a judicial procedure”). The LifeSaving Medicines Export Act grants compulsory licenses to improve access to medicines,
and not to remedy anti-competitive pricing or practices. Nevertheless, the same analysis
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Saving Medicines Export Act provides that a generic company may appeal the denial of its application for a compulsory license in the U.S.
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.216 Judicial review in the federal courts
can be more time-consuming and the status of a compulsory licensing
application may not be resolved for years. Therefore, initial review by an
administrative body may be more desirable in the interest of expediency.
An example of such an administrative body would be the PTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, where a patent applicant may first appeal a final patent rejection before appealing to the U.S. Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals.217
Furthermore, a provision requiring compulsory licenses in certain cases
should be considered. Such mandatory licensing is advantageous because
it: reduces transaction costs and uncertainty about whether a compulsory
license will be available, ensures that policy goals are served; prevents
patent holders from coercing government officials into blocking a compulsory license; and stops opportunities for corruption by generic companies or patent holders.218 Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of a
minimum basis for a mandatory compulsory license that would not face
extreme resistance by both the pharmaceutical sector and IPR proponents. Consequently, the United States should omit any such mandatory
provision from the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act and seek to establish a fundamental system, rather than risking the entire compulsory licensing system. Once a basic system is implemented pursuant to the
2003 Decision219 and successfully increases access to essential medicines, then legislators can consider additional provisions such as one
granting mandatory authorization in limited circumstances.
The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also attempts to create a compulsory licensing system that is smarter than its Canadian equivalent by
creating an advisory board to consider the conflicting interests that a
compulsory license would affect—the rights of both patent-owning and
generic pharmaceutical companies, the severity of health pandemics, and
the needs of impoverished countries.220 However, the advisory board’s

would apply to review of compulsory licenses granted pursuant to the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act. The basic argument is simply that administrative procedures are more
expeditious than the judicial process.
216. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
217. See U.S. PTO, Appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and to the
Courts, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#appeal (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
218. See LOVE, supra note 210, at 245.
219. See supra Part I.C.
220. See S. 3175 § 5. See also supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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role is more significant under the Life-Savings Medicines Export Act
than its Canadian counterpart, whose role is limited to only assisting in
recommendations for approved medicines.221 Because a compulsory licensing system involves many conflicting interests, the National Advisory Board on Implementation of the General Council Decision was designed so that no interest is completely disregarded. Such an advisory
board is critical in guiding the U.S. compulsory licensing system to success.
C. Economic Incentives
More important than procedural efficiencies is the need to provide generic companies with financial incentives. The CIPIH summarized this
point best when it said: “Although their business models are different,
generic companies share with the research-based industry the common
motivation of serving the interests of their shareholders. The mechanism
will not be used if the financial incentives for participation, taking account of the risks involved, are deemed inadequate.”222 The problem here
is twofold. First, as a private, profit-seeking firm, a generic company will
not produce essential medicines—even if they do save lives—if the market does not allow the generic company to meet its minimum rate of return on development of the medicines.223 Second, developing countries
need these life-saving medicines the most, but lack the funding required
to allow generic companies to meet their minimum rates of return.224 Because it is outside of the scope of this Note to address the problem of
poverty in developing countries, this Part focuses on whether the LifeSaving Medicines Export Act allows generic companies to exceed their
minimum rates of return, thus motivating them to participate in the compulsory licensing system.
The Pledge to Africa Act, the model or template for the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act, also fails to provide adequate economic incentives.225 For instance, the two-year lifespan of a Canadian compulsory
license lifespan is too short.226 Even though the license may be extended
221. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.18. See also supra notes 172–74 and accompanying
text.
222. WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 17, at 136.
223. See RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 163.
224. See id.
225. See CGPA, Government Amendments to Bill C-9 Fall Short, supra note 143.
226. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.09; CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, THE JEAN
CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS
TREATMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, supra note 141.
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for an additional two years227 and the generic company may apply for
another license after expiration of the first license, the short compulsory
license term does not provide adequate economic incentives to produce
drugs under the new system.228 The financial costs and associated risks of
applying for a compulsory license may exceed the revenue generated
during the short license term.229 Because a generic company must still
incur R&D costs—albeit not as high as new drug R&D—the generic
company must also be permitted to recover these costs during the lifespan of the compulsory license. The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act
improves this situation by setting the lifespan of a U.S. compulsory license at seven years, with a potential extension for another seven
years.230 Although the lifespan of a U.S. compulsory license is over three
times as long as its Canadian equivalent, it is nevertheless still insufficient to allow a generic company to recoup its production costs. If a patent is set to expire in fewer than seven years, a generic company will not
apply for a compulsory license to produce the medicine because it will
fear that other companies will produce generic equivalents once the patent expires,231 which may undercut the generic company’s profits. Moreover, most of the generic company’s seven-year window will be devoted
to the task of having to reverse-engineer the medicine without the patent
holder’s assistance.232 Therefore, a generic company will refuse to participate when a short compulsory lifespan creates such a great risk of
economic loss.
Moreover, a longer lifespan will not significantly increase the profits of
a generic company when the compulsory license limits the quantity of
medicines that can be produced, and consequently limits the profits that
may be earned. Therefore, the United States must do more to ensure that
the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act reduces the economic burdens that
may deter generic companies from producing essential medicines for

227. See 2004 S.C., ch. 23 § 21.12(1)–(2). See also supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
228. CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN PLEDGE TO AFRICA
ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 5, supra note 141.
229. See id.
230. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
231. See F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Countries 28 (Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working
Paper No. WG4:1, 2001).
232. See id. at 30.
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developing countries.233 Specifically, the United States must assess the
costs and risks involved in producing medicines under the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act, and attempt to minimize both.
1. The Cost and Risk to the Generic Company
Even though a generic company does not incur the high costs of new
drug R&D, it must bear the significant burden of front-end investment.234
The pharmaceutical industry is knowledge intensive, and most of the cost
lies in R&D of new drugs.235 However, a generic company must still incur the costs of producing the medicine, which involves reverseengineering the drugs without assistance from the patent holder.236 The
patent specifications may not provide the generic company with enough
information to facilitate quick and easy reproduction of the medicine.237
Moreover, the most efficient process for manufacturing the medicine
may be protected by a different patent, which may be owned by yet another pharmaceutical company.238
A generic company also incurs the cost of royalty payments to the patent holder, which must be paid within forty-five days of exporting the
medicine,239 regardless of whether the generic company has seen any
sales profit from the medicines. Although the Life-Saving Medicines
Export Act caps the maximum royalty payment at four percent of the
patented medicine’s commercial value,240 this payment may still be relatively costly. Because patented medicines enjoy market exclusivity, and
are therefore priced high to recoup hefty R&D expenses,241 a seemingly
low maximum royalty of four percent may nevertheless burden the generic company if the medicine has high commercial value.
Moreover, a generic company faces the risk that the market demand for
the medicines will not be great enough within the importing country, despite the discounted prices, to meet supply. Because the generic company
233. The WHO CIPIH recognizes that generic companies, like patent-owning companies, are driven by corporate profits. See WHO CIPIH, Public Health: Innovation and
Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 17, at 120.
234. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 231, at 6.
235. See PhRMA, Key Industry Facts/About PhRMA, supra note 19.
236. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 231, at 30.
237. See PEDRO ROFFE WITH CHRISTOPH SPENNEMANN & JOHANNA VON BRAUN, From
Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
in NEGOTIATING HEALTH 9, 14 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006).
238. See id. at 14–15.
239. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
240. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing new drug development
costs).
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may only export the medicines to the specified importing country, the
generic company must bear the loss if it is unable to sell enough medicine to that country.
2. Reducing the Cost and Risk to the Generic Company
First, turning to the generic drug production cost specifically addressed
in the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act, a generic company licensee
must pay remuneration to the patent holder.242 The determination of the
amount of royalty payment is important because it must compensate the
patent holder while also permitting the generic company to sell the medicine at a low price to the impoverished individuals who need access to
these life-saving essential medicines.243
242. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
243. In the case of compensation to a patent holder for patent infringement, U.S. patent
laws award damages that are “adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”
Scherer & Watal, supra note 231, at 22 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284). If a compulsory licensing system were to similarly grant royalty payments that were “adequate to compensate”
as measured by the profits lost by the patent holder, the royalty payments would be so
high that the generic company could not afford to reduce a drug price lower than that of
the patented drug, and there would be no increase in accessibility to patented essential
medicines. Id. at 23.
While there are countless ways to calculate remuneration, James Love looks at
four commonly used methods. First, the most basic royalty determination is outlined in
the 2001 UN Development Programme Human Development Report, which recommends
a royalty set at four percent of the selling price of the generic medicine. In addition, generic companies could pay an extra one to two percent for medicines with special therapeutic value, or one to two percent less when R&D has received at least partial public
funding. Second, the Japanese Patent Office established a royalty standard of two to four
percent, with higher rates paid to inventions with higher profit margins. This determination also takes into account the “utilization factor,” or the relative importance of the patent in the complete product. This determination works well where there are multiple patented products or processes covering one medicine, such as with HIV/AIDS combination
drugs. Third, the Canadian royalty determination under the Pledge to Africa Act utilizes a
sliding scale from 0.02 to 4 percent, with the highest royalty paid when medicines are
imported by the most highly developed countries as determined by the Human Development Report:
178 – (importing country’s HDI rank)
177

X 0.04

While this royalty determination is only slightly connected to the affordability of medicines in the importing country, it also takes into account the generic manufacturing cost.
Lastly, the more complex 2005 Tiered Royalty Method starts with a four percent royalty
for high-income markets, which is decreased based on capacity to pay (as measured by
per capita income or relative gross domestic product). Under this last method, royalties
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The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act uses a case-by-case royalty determination considering several factors, yet also provides that an alternate royalty rate formula may be used, which closely resembles that of
the Pledge to Africa Act.244 By using such a formula, a patent holder receives a lower royalty payment when the importing country is a less developed country. While the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act does factor in the humanitarian reasons for issuing the compulsory license, as
well as the need for low-cost medicines, this royalty formula, as well as
the discretion given in determining the royalty, fails to factor in the
medicine’s therapeutic value or the ability of the generic company to pay
the royalty amount.245 It is crucial that the PTO ensures that a royalty
amount is low enough so that a generic company is not dissuaded from
applying for a compulsory license.
While it has been argued that insufficient royalty payments would discourage R&D-based pharmaceutical companies from continuing their
innovations, it is unlikely that these minimal royalty payments would
have a significant impact on the patent holder. The pharmaceutical sector
is the most lucrative industry in the United States and its profits more
than make up for its R&D costs.246 In addition, the prices of generic
medicines have arguably little correlation to the actual cost of producing
the drugs, and therefore could be drastically reduced without undercutting funds for R&D innovations.247 Furthermore, the estimate of R&D
costs by pharmaceutical companies does not factor in the generous tax
incentives they receive.248 Therefore, because there would be no overwhelming burden placed on patent holders by reduced royalty payments
for a relatively small market, there is no clear reason why the United
are therefore lower for countries with both low income and high incident of disease. See
LOVE, supra note 210, at 246–48.
244. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
245. See S. 3175 § 3(a).
246. See Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
July 15, 2004. The Public Citizen’s Congress Watch reported that, in 2000, the drug industry ranked “more profitable than any other” in the Fortune 500 review of America’s
largest companies. The eleven pharmaceutical companies in the Fortune 500 saw nineteen percent return on revenue, while all the other Fortune 500 countries saw only a five
percent return on revenue. See PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, RX R&D MYTHS:
THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD” 11 (2001).
247. See Angell, supra note 246.
248. See Joseph, supra note 91, at 433. The Public Citizen’s Congress Watch noted
that the pharmaceutical industry enjoys a thirty-four percent tax deduction on R&D expenditures. In addition, from 1993–1996, the industry’s effective tax rate, the tax liability
owed to the government, was sixteen percent, compared to the twenty-seven percent paid
by other industries. See RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY’S
R&D “SCARE CARD,” supra note 246, at 15–16.
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States should lower royalty payments to ease the burden on generic companies.
In addition to ensuring low royalty payments, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act must also reduce the front-end investment as much as
possible for the generic company.249 The cost of manufacturing the generic medicines would be lower if the patent holder assisted the generic
company in the re-engineering process. One possible way to motivate the
patent holder to enter into such an agreement would be to set a higher
royalty payment if the patent holder assists the generic company in developing the medicine. However, this alternative royalty calculation
would need to take into account the cost to the patent holder in assisting
the generic company, the cost savings to the generic company in receiving such assistance, and the need to keep the royalty payments as low as
possible to permit the generic company to charge low drug prices to the
importing country. In the alternative, public funding could offset the
costs of the re-engineering effort. Options for public assistance include
granting government subsidies to the generic company to be used solely
to reverse-engineer the medicines, providing tax incentives to the generic
company to help defray costs in general,250 or directly assisting with the
development effort by directing government-run facilities to aid in the
reverse-engineering effort.
In addition to the motivation created by lower front-end investment, a
generic company is also more likely to produce generic medicines for
export when the prospective market is large, and therefore, the generic
company anticipates that sales will compensate its investment costs.251
While the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act does increase the potential
market size by permitting multi-country applications,252 generic companies should be permitted to enter into export agreements directly with
NGOs. The potential market size would be much greater, since NGOs
could use the medicines to service multiple countries.253 However, de249. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 231, at 6.
250. See id. at 54–59. Section 170(e)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code permits
corporations to deduct charitable donations “used by the donee solely for the care of the
ill, the needy, or infants,” which would allow a pharmaceutical company to recover some
of the cost of donated medicines. I.R.C. § 170(e)(3). However, as the tax law is currently
designed, it is likely that the tax incentive is not great enough to encourage charitable
donations of life-saving medicines, as the donor may incur substantial net cost in producing the medicines. Instead, the tax laws must be reworked to impose zero net cost on the
donor. See Scherer & Watal, supra note 231, at 58.
251. See id. at 6.
252. See S. 3175 § 3(a). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
253. MSF, for instance, is an “international humanitarian aid organization that provides
emergency medical assistance to populations in danger in more than [seventy] countries.”

2007]

LIFE-SAVING MEDICINES EXPORT ACT

275

spite such potentially large markets, there is still no guaranteed market
for generic medicines. Just as patent protection ensures a patent holder
that a sufficient market exists to allow the patent holder to meet its
minimum rate of return, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act also
needs a mechanism to ensure a sufficient market. This may require the
United States, or other financial donors, to enter into precommitments to
purchase the generic medicines on behalf of the importing country if the
importing country is unable to afford the medicines.254
CONCLUSION
Even though the TRIPS Agreement authorizes compulsory licensing255
and the 2003 Decision permits export of medicines produced under compulsory licenses,256 it is still unclear how a country can implement such a
system effectively. While Canada’s Pledge to Africa Act was praised as
the first legislation of its kind by a highly developed country, it has failed
to increase access to essential life-saving medicines in the impoverished,
underdeveloped world. Undoubtedly, the U.S. position on compulsory
licenses for public health problems has made great progress since the
days when the government staunchly opposed similar actions by South
Africa in 1997.257 However, the United States still has a long way to go
to do its part in improving access to medicines. In view of this goal, the
United States hopes to follow in Canada’s footsteps with the Life-Saving
Medicines Export Act. Unfortunately, as it stands, the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act may also suffer the same fate as the Pledge to Africa
Act; even if the bill survives and is passed into law, it is not likely that
generic companies or importing countries will be eager to participate in
the U.S. system. Because developing countries do not make the most
attractive market for profit-seeking generic companies, the United States
must greatly increase the economic incentives and reduce the procedural
barriers of the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act.

See MSF, About MSF: The MSF Role in Emergency Medical Aid,
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=130CB2BA-E018-0C72-0970
46C7C42A8573&component=toolkit.indexArticle&method=full_html (last visited Oct.
9, 2007).
254. See WHO CMH, supra note 11, at 84 (using a similar argument to assert that
precommitment by donors to purchase essential medicines would incentivize R&Dfocused pharmaceutical companies to allocate resources to target diseases only affecting
poorer developing countries).
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. See supra I.C.
257. See supra I.D.
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Moreover, skeptics of compulsory licensing schema are reluctant to put
great reliance on these licenses:
[P]olicy-makers should view non-voluntary licensing of patented inventions as but one item in an arsenal of tools that may be used to promote national systems of innovations . . . excessive reliance on compulsory licensing of patented inventions may simply mask deeper structural problems and make them harder to solve in the long run.258

These critics argue that differential pricing of patented medicines and
voluntary license agreements should be favored over governmentauthorized compulsory licenses.259 However, given the substantial urgency for essential life-saving medicines to treat diseases such as the
HIV/AIDS pandemic,260 the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act may be a
good start in developing a temporary solution to the problem. It is understandable that a pharmaceutical patent holder must be rewarded for its
medical innovations, and must also be permitted market exclusivity to
recoup the economic outlay for its extensive R&D. Nevertheless, the
United States must step up and address the public health crises of developing countries that those countries cannot tackle themselves. At the
very least, the United States can succeed as it did with Cipro,261 and use
the threat of compulsory licensing under the Life-Saving Medicines Export Act to compel patent-holding pharmaceutical companies to reduce
prices, thereby increasing access to the most essential life-saving medicines for the world’s most destitute and powerless individuals.
Jennifer A. Lazo*

258. See ROFFE, supra note 237, at 14 (citing Jerome H. Reichman with Catherine
Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective,
Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA
(UN Conference on Trade and Dev. & Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Issue
Paper No. 5, 2003)).
259. For a discussion on differential pricing and voluntary licensing agreements between patent holders and generic companies, see WHO CMH, supra note 11, at 87–91.
260. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the AIDS
pandemic in 2006).
261. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (explaining the anthrax scare in
2001 and the U.S. government’s threat to override the Cipro patent).
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